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JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY AND 
CONTRIBUTION UNDER CERCLA 
SECTIONS 107(a)(4)(B) AND 113(f)(1) 
Daniel D. Barnhizer* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response 
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA")l in 1980 to deal with 
the growing number of toxic and hazardous waste sites which 
threatened public health and the nation's environment.2 Enacted in 
the twilight of the Carter administration, CERCLA is often seen as 
a confused compromise measure which may impose harsh or even 
draconian penalties to further its two espoused goals-(1) making 
the polluter pay for the costs of cleanup and (2) cleaning up haz-
ardous waste sites quickly.3 CERCLA authorizes the Environmental 
Protection Agency ("EPA") to take several different approaches to 
enforcement. EPA may sponsor cleanups of hazardous waste sites 
("sites") and later seek reimbursement for its cleanup costs from . 
polluters. EPA may also choose to impose an administrative order 
pursuant to CERCLA section 106(a)4 requiring one or several po-
tentially responsible parties ("PRPs") to cleanup a site. The PRPs 
may seek thereafter to recover their costs from other PRPs who did 
not participate in the cleanup effort.5 Finally, under CERCLA sec-
tion 113(f),6 EPA may choose to settle its claims for cleanup costs 
with one, some, or all of the PRPs at a site, offering those PRPs 
nearly complete protection from subsequent suits by non-settling 
parties in return for a quick settlement. 7 
* Harvard Law School, Class of 1995; B.A., Miami University, 1991. 
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988) (hereinafter CERCLA). 
2. See Legislative History, Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation 
and Liability Act ("CERCLA") Pub. L. 96-510, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.) 6119, 6120. 
3. See Transtech Indus. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 798 F. Supp. 1079, 1082 (D. N.J. 
1992); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142 (E.D. Pa. 
1982) (noting "[CERCLA] itself is vague and its legislative history indefinite .... 
[CERCLA] is a severely diminished piece of compromise legislation from which a number 
of significant features were deleted."). 
4. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). 
5. See id. §§ 9607(a)(4)(B), 9613(f)(1). 
6. ld. § 9613(f). 
7. See id. § 9613(f)(2). 
563 
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While the original version of CERCLA contained no provision 
that specifically created a private cause of action by which PRPs 
might recover their response costs from other PRPs, many courts 
read section 107(a) to imply such a private right of action.s In 1986, 
Congress amended the original enactment with the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 19869 ("SARA") which 
specifically allowed private parties to bring suits for contribution 
to recover response costs incurred as a result of their cleanup of a 
hazardous waste site under section 113(f)(1).lo 
II. DUAL ACTION AND SINGLE ACTION SCENARIOS 
EPA will sometimes determine that a site has released or 
threatens to release toxic or hazardous materials into the environ-
ment. EPA may then issue an administrative order under CERCLA 
section 106,11 requiring a PRP to initiate cleanup at the site. 12 
Mter incurring response costs at the site, the PRP affected by 
the EPA order ("responding PRP") may seek to recover some part 
of its response costs from other PRPs. This recovery action may be 
initiated under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B)13 or under CERCLA 
8. See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 
1983). 
9. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). 
10. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988). 
11. ld. § 9606. 
12. See, e.g., Transtech Indus. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 798 F. Supp. 1079, 1086-87 
(D.N.r. 1992) (noting that failure to comply with a § 106(a) Administrative Order carries 
a fine of up to $25,000 per day of noncompliance). See also 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(I) (1988) 
(listing the several enforcement actions available to the government in securing site 
cleanup). 
13. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B) provides, in pertinent part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to 
defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-.... 
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for trans-
port to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected 
by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which 
causes the incurrence or response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be 
liable for-.... 
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person 
consistent with the national contingency plan .... 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). 
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section 113(f)(1),14 although the case law gives little or no guid-
ance as to which is the proper legal avenue. 
Theoretically, a successful action under section 107(a) ("re-
sponse-recovery action") should result in a recovery of all response 
costs from non-responding PRPs (who will be held jointly and 
severally liable for 100% of the response costS).15 The responding 
PRP may obtain a full judgment against the non-responding PRPs 
who may in turn respond with counter- or cross-claims under sec-
tion 113(f)(1) for contribution ("contribution action").16 A case 
involving both successive response-recovery actions and contribu-
tion actions will be termed a "dual action scenario." In a dual 
action scenario, burdens of proof may be shifted onto non-respond-
ing PRPs. Defendants in a response-recovery action under CERCLA 
section 107(a)-i.e., non-responding PRPs-are limited to the 
three defenses listed in CERCLA section 107(b):17 (1) an act of 
God; (2) an act of war; or (3) a complete absence of causation.ls 
Non-responding PRPs are strictly, jointly and severally liable for 
all response costS.19 
In a contribution action, however, the burden of proof is not 
shifted so dramatically. The defendant in a contribution action, 
possibly the responding PRP, may assert equitable defenses against 
those seeking contribution.20 Thus, in a dual action scenario, a 
14. CERCLA § 113(f)(1) provides: 
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or 
potentially liable under section [107(a)] of this title, during or following any 
civil action under section [106] of this title or under section [107(a)] of this 
title .... In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response 
costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines 
are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any 
person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under 
section [106] or section [107] of this title. 
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1988). 
15. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 416 (D. N.J. 1991). 
16. See, e.g., id. at 412-13. 
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)-(b) (1988). 
18. See Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 411, (citing United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 
F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989». 
19. See id. at 413. 
20. See, e.g., id. at 412-13 (holding that courts, in contribution actions, may 
consider the equities of the case, in "sharp contrast" to response-recovery actions, against 
which the only defense is a complete lack of causation); see also Envtl. Transp. Sys. v. 
ENSCO, 969 F.2d 503, 509-11 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that courts, in contribution actions, 
must consider each case under a case-by-case analysis and may consider one, several, or 
many factors as dispositive); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Koppers Co., 771 F. Supp. 1420, 
HeinOnline -- 18 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 566 1994
566 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 18:563 
responding PRP may obtain a judgment against the non-responding 
PRPs for all of the response costs. The responding PRP may then 
assert equitable defenses to limit or defeat any contribution action 
initiated by the non-responding PRPs to recover some part of the 
cleanup costs from the responding PRP. 
Other jurisdictions have treated all suits between PRPs for the 
recovery of response costs as suits for contribution, whether the 
claim is brought under section 107(a)(4) or under section 113(f)(1). 
These jurisdictions have thus cut the two step process down to 
one.21 This streamlined process will be termed a "single action 
scenario." At present, jurisdictions considering this issue appear 
evenly split as to which scenario the statute requires. 
III. ANALYZING THE DUAL ACTION SCENARIO 
Courts have noted several different factors militating in favor 
of the dual action scenario, most of which suggest that this sce-
nario may be characterized as a "carrot and stick" approach.22 PRPs 
who settle or otherwise quickly discharge their CERCLA liability 
are given a "carrot" in the form of protection from suits for con-
tribution from other PRPs, and can recover response costs for which 
they are not directly liable. PRPs who refuse to settle are given the 
"stick" in the form of joint and several liability. 
Several courts have found a distinction between a response-re-
covery action by a responding PRP under CERCLA section 107 
and a contribution action under section 113, holding that each 
provision creates a distinct cause of action, the first imposing joint 
1426-27 (D. Md. 1991) (noting action for contribution allows court to consider equitable 
factors in apportioning liability between the parties). 
21. See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(noting "When one liable party sues another to recover its equitable share of the response 
costs, the action is one for contribution .... "); Weyerhaeuser, 771 F. Supp. at 1426; In 
re Dant & Russel, 951 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1991) (implying that a suit between PRPs 
is a suit for contribution, even if it is brought as a response-recovery action under 
CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B». In a single action scenario, all apportionment is per-
formed equitably during a single phase of litigation. See, e.g., Amoco, 889 F.2d 672-73 
(5th Cir. 1989) (holding suits between PRPs are in the nature of contribution and the court 
must equitably apportion each party's share of the response costs). 
22. See Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 415-17 (collapsing the distinction between CERCLA 
§ 107(a)(4)(B) and § 113(f)(I) ignores the incentive which joint and several liability 
creates to settle and/or cleanup quickly); AlIied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, 691 
F. Supp. 1100, 1117-19 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (noting that joint and several liability provides 
all PRPs with an incentive to cleanup sites quickly). 
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and several liability on the non-responding PRPs, and the second 
allowing the non-responding PRPs to bring an action for contribu-
tion.23 While some courts have neglected to analyze the issue,24 
others have noted several reasons to think that CERCLA requires 
a dual action scenario: the structure of the statute, CERCLA's 
policy goals of expeditious cleanup and making polluters pay, and 
incentive structures all weigh in favor of the dual action approach. 
A. Statutory Analysis 
Several courts have found that the principles underlying the 
structure of CERCLA favor making a distinction between response-
recovery actions under section 107 and contribution actions under 
section 113. Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Time Oil CO.25 is 
one of the most analytically sound of the dual action cases. 
The Burlington court found that CERCLA created a structure 
which required interpretation of section 107(a)(b)(B) as distinct 
and separate from section 113(f)(2).26 Burlington noted three sepa-
rate provisions in CERCLA which make a distinction between 
actions under the two sections.21 For example, section 113(g)(2),28 
dealing with the statutes of limitations for response-recovery and 
contribution actions, provides for a three year limitation for con-
23. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 786 F. Supp. 471 
(E.D. Pa. 1992); Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 413-15 ; Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of 
Va. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1269, 1277-78 (E.D. Va. 1992); Burlington 
N. R.R. Co. v. Time Oil Co., 738 F. Supp. 1339" 1342-43 (W.D. Wash. 1990), overruled 
by implication in In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 951 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1991); AT&T 
Technologies, Inc. v. Heleva, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6898 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Allied Corp. 
v. ACME Solvents Reclaiming, 691 F. Supp. 1100, 116-19 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
24. See, e.g., FMC, 786 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1992). Other cases, such as Smith 
Land & Imp. Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3rd Cir. 1988), incorrectly analyzed 
the legal question. The Smith Land court clearly stated that equitable defenses are 
unavailable to a defendant in an action to determine initial liability under CERCLA 
§ 107(a). ld. at 89. The Smith Land court went on, however, to accept the equitable 
doctrine of caveat emptor as an appropriate defense to the response-recovery action and 
held that the the responding PRP/plaintiff, if successful, could "recover an amount deemed 
equitable for [response costs expended]," as if the action were one for contribution. ld. 
(emphasis added). See also Transtech Indus. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 798 F. Supp. 1079, 
1087 (D. N.J. 1992) (seizing on the Smith Land holding to collapse the distinction between 
§ 107(a)(4)(B) and § 113(f)(1) actions). 
25. 738 F. Supp. 1339 (W.D. Wash. 1990). 
26. ld. at 1342-43. 
27.ld. 
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2) (1988). 
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tribution actions and a six year limitation for cost recovery after 
construction of on-site remedial measures.29 
Burlington also found the legislative distinction drawn in sec-
tion 113(h)(1) significant.30 Section 113(h)(1) provides that a court 
may review an action "to recover response costs or damages or for 
contribution".31 The Burlington court found it significant that Con-
gress had chosen in this provision to list the separate actions eli-
gible for judicial review, even though the section does not provide 
for different standards of treatment for response-recovery actions 
and contribution actions.32 
Finally, the Burlington court examined the different defenses 
available against response-recovery actions and contribution ac-
tions and found that those differences suggested a congressional 
intent to maintain separate causes of action.33 Section 107(a) im-
poses strict, joint and several liability for all of a responding PRP's 
response costs "subject only to the defenses set out in [section 
107(b)]."34 The defenses available to a defendant in a response-re~ 
covery action-i.e., to a non-responding PRP-therefore do not 
include settlement with the government, the responding PRP's li~ 
ability under section 113, or any other equitable defenses.35 
Under CERCLA section 113(t)(1), however, defendants may 
raise equitable defenses against claims for contribution.36 The avail-
ability of equitable defenses in CERCLA section 113(t)(1) contri-
bution actions, and the relative lack of any available defenses under 
CERCLA section 107(a) response-recovery actions, have driven 
much of the litigation in this area, with the various litigants at~ 
tempting to characterize a PRP's liability under one or the other 
sections. 
The court in United States v. Kramer37 also applied a similar 
analysis to find the statute's language supported a distinction be-
tween the two types of actions. The Kramer court emphasized the 
29. Burlington, 738 F. Supp. at 1342-43. 
30. Burlington, 738 F. Supp. at 1343. 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(I)(1988). 
32. See Burlington, 738 F. Supp at 1343. 
33. See id. 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). 
35. See id. § 9607(b); see also Burlington, 738 F. Supp. at 1343. 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988), (noting that "In resolving contribution claims, 
the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as 
the court determines are appropriate" (emphasis added». 
37. 757 F. Supp. 397 (D. N.J. 1991). 
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language of CERCLA section 107(a) imposing liability "[n]otwith-
standing any other provision or rule of law and subject only to 
defenses set forth in [section 107(b)]."38 For the Kramer court, 
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision or rule of law ... means 
that Congress clearly intended to maintain CERCLA section 107(a) 
as a separate and distinct cause of action the force of which should 
not be diluted by the application of other provisions such as CERCLA 
section 113(f)(1).39 
The court in Allied Corporation v. ACME Solvents Reclaim-
ing40 also relied on a close examination of a particular aspect of 
the statute. The court noted that the 1986 SARA amendments 
explicitly created a permissive right to contribution41 but did not 
narrow the rights of the responding PRP by forcing the square peg 
of a response-recovery action under section 107(a)(4)(B) into the 
round hole of a contribution action under section 113(f)(1).42 In 
other words, the responding PRP may seek to recover its response 
costs under either section. The Allied court's analysis appears to 
rest on its belief that while strict, joint and several liability was 
already available to responding PRPs under CERCLA section 107, 
Congress did not remove that option with the 1986 amendments, 
but rather gave plaintiffs the additional option of bringing a con-
tribution action.43 
Finally, the court in Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of 
Virginia v. Peck Iron & Metal CO.44 focused on the plain language 
of section 107(a)(4)(B)45 in deciding that a responding PRP was 
entitled to maintain separate causes of action.46 The Chesapeake 
court focused specifically on the absence of any indication that the 
term "any other person" in section 107(a)(4)(B) did not apply to 
PRPS.47 The court applied the rule that, absent a specific legislative 
38. See Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 416 (citing 42. U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988)). 
39. See id. 
40. 691 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. TIL 1988). 
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988) "[a]ny person may seek contribution from 
any person who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) . . . during or 
following any civil action under [sections 9606 or 9607(a)]" (emphasis added)). 
42. See Allied, 691 F. Supp at 1118. 
43. See id. 
44. 814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1992). 
45. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). 
46. See Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. 
Supp. 1269, 1272 (E.D. Va. 1992). 
47.ld. 
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intent to the contrary, the text of the statute itself must direct the 
actions of the court. As the court did not find that the text of 
CERCLA clearly required a response-recovery action to be treated 
as an action for contribution, it held that the responding PRP could 
bring an action under either section.48 
B. Incentive Structures and Goals of CERCLA 
The other major argument in favor of the dual action scenario 
notes that such a scenario creates incentives among PRPs to further 
the expressed goals of CERCLA-expediting cleanup while forc-
ing those who caused the harm to fund remedial efforts. The dual 
action courts view CERCLA section 107(a) actions, properly han-
dled, as providing incentives for private parties to risk the large 
amounts of capital necessary to fund a CERCLA cleanup.49 
The Kramer court noted that section 107 permits a private 
party to "go in, clean up the mess, pay the bill, then collect all its 
costs not inconsistent with the NCP from other responsible parties-even 
if plaintiff was also responsible for the contamination."50 While other 
non-responding PRPs may later seek contribution from the re-
sponding PRP, the net effect is a "temporary windfall" which en-
sures that the responding PRP will be rewarded for acting quickly 
to remedy the environmental damage.s' 
The flaw in this logic, however, lies in the assumption that the 
non-responding PRPs, after assuming joint and several liability for 
100% of the response costs, will be able to recover any significant 
amount from the responding PRP. The burden of seeking contribu-
tion may be unfair to non-responding PRPs who may, in fact, be 
only minimally responsible for the pollution.52 In a worst case 
scenario, with a responding PRP responsible for 85% of the harm 
and the remainder distributed among de minimis contributors and 
bankrupt or otherwise judgment-proof PRPs, the responding PRP 
48.Id. 
49. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp 397, 416 (D. N.J. 1991). 
50.Id. 
5!. Id. at 417. 
52. Cf. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. 
Supp. 1269, 1277 (E.D. Va. 1992) (noting that plaintiff, "itself liable under CERCLA, 
should not benefit from starting the cleanup operation unilaterally and being the first to 
the courthouse door to sue its confederates in environmental misbehavior," and that 
plaintiff should not benefit from its own tortious activity). 
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could recover 100% of the response costs, imposing joint and 
several liability on the de minimis contributors.53 Without a class 
action to aggregate their claims and lower the cost of bringing each 
individual claim, many of the de minimis contributors would drop 
out or seek protection in bankruptcy. 54 A contribution action also 
would obtain only 85% of the total cost at most-the responding 
PRP's share. A court could foreseeably allocate all remaining "or-
phan" shares-those parts of the harm for which bankrupt or oth-
erwise judgment proof PRPs are responsible-among the de mini-
mis contributors.55 Such a situation could imaginably result in a 
single PRP, contributor of 1 % of the total harm, being held liable 
for 15% (or more) of the response costs. 
The Chesapeake court strongly disapproved of awarding such 
a large windfall to a responding PRP. Although it noted the Kramer 
court's advocacy of the windfall incentive, the district court in 
Chesapeake went on to hold: 
While the Court recognizes the potential value of this incentive, 
it has nonetheless attempted to minimize the windfall by ruling 
at this time, in advance of the contribution phase of the lawsuit, 
that the Plaintiff will not be allowed to recover those costs 
attributable to its own dumping or the orphan shares allocated 
to it by the Court .... Thus ... the Court will streamline this 
procedure by holding that, at no time, will any defendant have 
to pay for environmental harm attributable to [the Plaintiff].56 
The Chesapeake court thus minimized the windfall incentive 
of the Kramer decision but retained one important aspect: by im-
posing joint and several liability for the defendants' share of the 
total harm, the court ensured that the responding PRP will receive 
that portion of cleanup costs not attributable to itself (less the costs 
53. E.g., Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 416-17 (allowing responding PRP to recover 
100% of response costs against smaller non-responding PRPs). 
54. For an example of a debtor seeking protection from environmental claims by 
entering bankruptcy, see In re Dant & Russell, 951 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1991). 
55. See Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 416-17 (allowing responding PRP to recover all 
of its response costs and then noting the responding PRP "will be reimbursed perhaps in 
excess of what might be shown in a section 113 action to have been [its] equitable share."); 
Cf. Chesapeake, 814 F. Supp. at 1277-78 (avoiding this problem by imposing joint ·and 
several liability only to the extent of the non-responding PRPs' share of the cleanup costs, 
allocating orphan shares between responding PRPs and non-responding PRPs, and holding 
the responding PRP responsible for all cost directly attributable to its own actions). 
56. Chesapeake, 814 F. Supp. at 1278. 
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of the orphan shares allocated to the responding PRP). Under a 
section 113(f)(1) contribution action, the responding PRP could 
only be sure of obtaining the contribution of the named defen-
dants.57 The fate and allocation of any orphan share would be 
uncertain, possibly forcing the responding PRP to assume an equi-
table share of the burden for insolvent contributors and removing 
the incentives to step in quickly and clean-up a hazardous release. 
As noted in Allied: 
Policies underlying CERCLA support the notion that claims 
between PRPs are not always, and should not always be, in the 
nature of contribution .... CERCLA seeks the expeditious and 
safe clean up of hazardous waste sites. A blanket prohibition 
against joint and several liability in claims between responsible 
parties would discourage a willing PRP from cleaning up on its 
own. This is especially true where one or more of the parties are 
insolvent and, thus, incapable of sharing the costs of cleanup. 
In this situation, a PRP which is otherwise amenable to cleaning 
up may be discouraged from doing so if it knows that, where 
the harm is indivisible, its only recourse for reimbursement is 
contribution from the solvent PRP's. A prohibition against joint 
and several liability would leave the willing PRP holding the 
bag for the insolvent companies.58 
This incentive, however, may not be as important in cases where 
EPA has imposed an administrative order under CERCLA section 
106(a) on a PRP.59 Failure to comply with a section 106 order may 
result in further injunctions against the PRP and/or a $25,000 fine 
for every day the PRP's noncompliance continues.60 
IV. SINGLE ACTION SCENARIO 
Like the courts that find CERCLA provides for dual action 
scenario, several courts that find the statute provides for a single 
action scenario simply state with little or no analysis that a suit by 
a responding PRP against one or more non-responding PRPs for the 
recovery of response costs incurred at a site is a suit for contribu-
57. See Allied Corp. v. ACME Solvents Reclaiming, 691 F. Supp. 1100, 1118 (N.D. 
Ill. 1988). 
58. [d. at 1118. 
59. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). 
60. [d. § 9606(b). 
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tion rather than a suit for joint and severalliability.61 Where courts 
do take a more analytical approach, they base their arguments for 
the single action scenario on both statutory language and legisla-
tive history. 
A. Statutory Analysis 
Several of these courts closely analyze the statutory structure 
of CERCLA, finding that the statute requires response-recovery 
suits between PRPs to be in the nature of contribution. Most of 
these courts focus on the 1986 passage of SARA, which indicates 
congressional approval for suits for contribution under section 
113(f)(1).62 
In Transtech Industries v. A & Z Septic Clean,63 the plaintiff 
argued that CERCLA sections 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f)(1) created 
distinct causes of action. Section 107 (a), the plaintiff contended, 
with its limited defenses to joint and several liability, allowed cost 
recovery for voluntary responses. Section 113(f)(1), by contrast, 
with its range of equitable defenses to several liability only, was 
available to parties who responded involuntarily under threat of 
legal action by EPA.64 
The Transtech court rejected the plaintiff's voluntary coopera-
tion argument. In creating a specific cause of action for contribu-
tion among liable parties in SARA,65 Congress clarified and defined 
the responses available to responding PRPS.66 As the court states: 
"[W]hen properly construed, the two sections work together, one 
61. See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(citing CERCLA §113(f) (42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1988»); Ellman v. Woo, 34 Env't. Rep. 
Cas. (BNA) 1969, 1971 (E.D. Pa. 1991). It is unclear, however, whether the Ellman court 
described the suit as an action for contribution because only two parties were involved or 
for some other reason. See also In re Dant & Russell, 951 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(holding the court may treat a suit brought under CERCLA § 107(a) as a suit brought 
under CERCLA § 113(f)(1». 
62. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988). 
63. 798 F. Supp. 1079, 1085 (D.N.J. 1992). 
64. [d. at 1085; see also Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, 691 F. Supp. 
lIDO, 1118 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (advocating that decision whether to allow plaintiff PRP to 
pursue joint and several liability should be based in part on plaintiff's willingness to 
cooperate with EPA). 
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988). 
66. See Transtech, 798 F. Supp. at 1087. 
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governing liability and the other governing contribution from those 
found liable."67 
Other courts have followed Transtech's reasoning, holding that 
CERCLA sections 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f)(1) should be interpreted 
as a unit when deciding liability issues between a responding PRP 
and liable non-responding PRPs. The court in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. 
Koppers CO.,68 for example, held that the proper procedure in a 
response-recovery action under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B) is 
first to determine whether liability should be imposed and then to 
apportion that liability among all parties, including the responding 
PRP, in a contribution action under CERCLA section 113.69 
The court in PVO International v. Drew Chemical Corpora-
tion,70 also interpreted the statute as requiring sections 107(a)(4)(B) 
and 113(f)(1) to be read in conjunction with one another.71 The ques-
tion in PVO was whether the court should allow equitable factors 
to enter into its consideration of a response-recovery action.72 The 
court concluded that, because section 107 (a) (4) (B) "does not ex-
plicitly provide for apportionment of costs between liable par-
ties[,]" section 107 (a) (4) (B) should be read in conjunction with 
section 113(f)(1), which does explicitly provide for such apportion-
ment. 73 In apportioning liability in this manner, it is clear that the 
PVO court ignored a non-responding PRP's ability to seek contri-
bution from the responding PRP who prevailed in a section 
107 (a) (4) (B) action.74 
The court in AVNET v. Allied-Signa[7s went even further than 
most other courts, building on the language of the Transtech court. 
The court held that Congress enacted section 113(f)(1) only to 
clarify and affirm an existing cause of action under section 
107(a)(4)(B) already available to PRPs seeking to apportion re-
sponse costs: 
67. ld. at 1086. 
68. 771 F. Supp. 1420 (D. Md. 1991). 
69. ld. at 1425-27. 
70. 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20077 (D. N.J. 1988). 
71. ld. at 20080. 
72. See id. 
73. ld. See also Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, 696 F. Supp. 994, 1002-03 (D. 
N.J. 1988) (noting § 107(a)(4)(B) establishes liability and § 113(f)(1) allocates the con-
tribution of each party). 
74. See United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 416 (overruling by implication 
the PVO court's analysis). 
75. 825 F. Supp. 1132 (D.R.I. 1992). 
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[W]ith Section 113, Congress did not add a new cause of action, 
but showed that it was only affirming and making clear an 
existing cause of action for contribution under Section 107. 
Congress did not demonstrate in any way in the statute or in 
the legislative history that Section 113(f) was intended to be an 
independent, alternative cause of action distinct from the Sec-
tion 107 cost recovery action. Accordingly, there is no basis for 
the plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish between a cause of action 
under Section 107 and one under Section 113.76 
575 
By collapsing the two provisions, the AVNET court stands in clear 
opposition to cases such as Allied and Burlington, both of which 
found that Congress intended separate causes of action under sec-
tions 107 and 113.77 
B. Legislative History 
Among the courts that collapsed distinctions between a re-
sponse-recovery action under CERCLA section 107 and a contri-
bution action under CERCLA section 113, only the AVNET court 
makes any examination of the legislative history of section 113.18 
The court found persuasive the comments made by various legis-
lators during the passage of SARA who stated that the addition of 
section 113(f)(1) clarified the already existing right of contribution 
under CERCLA.79 
The AVNET court makes a slight logical jump in its analysis 
of this language by interpreting Congress' confirmation of a pre-
existing right of contribution as exclusive of any other cause of 
action available to responding PRPS.80 This analysis, however, ig-
nores the many statements in the legislative history which could 
be read to support an opposite holding, i.e., that Congress intended 
to maintain separate causes of action under sections 107(a)(4)(B) 
and 113(f)(1).81 For example, the legislative history notes that "as 
76. Id. at 1137 (footnotes omitted). 
77. See Allied, 691 F. Supp at 1118-19; see also Burlington, 738 F. Supp. at 
1342-43. 
78. See AVNET, 825 F. Supp. at 1136-38. 
79. See id. at 1137 n.32 (citing legislative history). 
80. See id. at 1137. 
81. See H. Rep. No. 99-253(1), 2d Sess. (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2835, 2861-63 (drawing distinctions between joint and several liability issues and contri-
bution issues). 
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with joint and several liability issues, contribution claims will be 
resolved pursuant to Federal common law," possibly drawing a 
distinction between the two types of actions.82 The legislative his-
tory also clarifies the differing period of limitation on the two 
causes of action: an action for contribution must be filed within 
three years after a date of judgment or entry of settlement while a 
response-recovery action must be filed within six years of the 
expenditure of response costS.83 These distinctions suggest a con-
gressional intent to keep separate the two causes of action. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The federal courts are split on the issue of whether a response-
recovery action brought by one PRP against one or more others is, 
in fact, an action for contribution, or whether they are separate and 
distinct causes of action. While a technical reading of CERCLA 
sections 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f)(1) supports maintaining a distinc-
tion between the two causes of action, many courts appear willing 
to overlook that distinction. Both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have 
asserted that any action to recover response costs between two 
liable parties is an action for contribution.84 Neither of these courts, 
however, appears to have closely examined the issue. Instead, the 
courts simply stated a cursory conclusion.8s Courts that have main-
tained a distinction between the causes of action, in contrast, ap-
pear to have examined the issue in more detail than their counter-
parts who have not.86 
Both sides of the dispute have examined the issue of fairness. 
Courts focusing on the burden borne by the responding PRP will 
tend to reward a cooperative responding PRP by allowing the PRP 
to seek joint and several liability of non-responding PRPS.87 These 
82. [d. at 2862. 
83. See id. at 2861. 
84. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1989); see also 
In re Dant & Russell, 951 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1991) (implied conclusion). 
85. See Amoco, 889 F.2d at 672; see also In re Dant & Russell, 951 F.2d at 249. 
86. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Time Oil Co., 738 F. Supp. 1339, 1342-43 
(W.D. Wash. 1990); Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, 691 F. Supp. 1100, 
1117-18 (N.D. TIL 1988). But see Transtech Indus. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 798 F. Supp. 
1079, 1085-87 (D. N.J. 1992) (adopting single action scenario after detailed examination 
of history and meaning of right of contribution). 
87. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 416-17 (D. N.J. 1991); 
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courts have often noted that PRPs found jointly and severally liable 
for all response costs may recover a share of the costs from the 
responding PRP through a contribution action.88 Other courts have 
focused on the burden joint and several liability places on non-re-
sponding PRPs and have declined to impose it. 89 Courts declining 
to impose joint and several liability in section 107(a)(4)(B) actions 
rarely mention the availability of a CERCLA section 113(f)(1) 
contribution action to non-prevailing defendants.9o 
The courts have split on this matter, not only between, but also 
within jurisdictions. It is unclear how any given court will decide 
(except in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits),91 and no court has laid 
down any distinguishing criteria. While there may be good argu-
ments for finding that the statute requires either a dual action or 
single action scenario, it is important that both the courts and 
Congress, in contemplating CERCLA's future, consider the need to 
state clearly and unambiguously which scenario is the correct one. 
Allied, 691 F.Supp. at 1118 (noting that inability to obtain fair reimbursement through 
joint and several liability would discourage willing PRP from effecting its own response). 
88. See Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 416-17; see also Allied, 691 F. Supp. at 1118. 
89. See, e.g., PVO Int'l v. Drew Chemical Corp., 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
20077, 20080 (D. N.J.) (holding that it is unfair to allocate entire burden of cleanup to 
defendants in a response recovery action); but see Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 416 (evincing 
disdain for this aspect of the PVO holding). 
90. Cf. PVO, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20080. 
91. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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